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Choreography	as	a	Medium	of	Protest	Susanne	Foellmer	
 
 Abstract:	This	article	focuses	on	the	idea	of	choreography	as	a	possible	medium	of	protest.	Dealing	with	the	media	theory	of	Niklas	Luhmann	in	the	framework	of	social	communication,	and	adopting	Randy	Martin’s	idea	of	an	interrelation	of	(danced)	movement	and	politics,	the	focus	lies	in	the	moments	of	migration	of	gestures	from	everyday	life	into	art	and	then	into	the	realm	of	politics.	By	analyzing	the	example	of	the	Istanbul	Duran	Adam	and	the	performance	of	choreographer	Ehud	Darash	in	Tel	Aviv,	the	key	question	is	in	which	moments	and	what	kind	of	formats	choreography	serves	as	a	medium	of	protest	by	blurring	the	boundaries	between	everyday	life,	art,	and	politics.	
 Keywords:	Mediality,	choreography,	politics	
 A	man	stands	alone	on	a	square.	Unmoving,	his	gaze	fixed	on	a	building.	Beside	him	is	his	rucksack,	which	he	has	put	down	as	if	he	is	waiting	for	something	that	sometimes	takes	a	while.	Passers-by	look	briefly	round	or	do	not	even	notice	that	something	is	going	on	here.	 But	 is	 anything	 actually	 going	 on?	 This	 seems	 unclear,	 even	 for	 the	 police,	who	appear	on	the	scene	after	a	while,	because	there	is	something	suspicious	to	them	about	a	man	standing	on	 the	spot,	not	moving,	apparently	not	doing	anything.	The	police	–	all	male	–	look	at	the	unmoving	man,	touch	him,	look	in	his	rucksack,	and	don’t	quite	know	what	 they	 should	do	now.	Eventually,	 they	move	 away	again	 empty-handed.	The	man	remains	standing,	unmoving,	looking	in	one	direction.	The	 situation	described	 is	 probably	 easily	 recognizable	 as	 performer	Erdem	Gündüz’s	
Duran	Adam	 (Standing	Man)	on	 Istanbul’s	Taksim	Square	 (June	2013).	The	 reason	 for	this	act	of	 standing,	during	which	he	 looked	 towards	 the	Atatürk	Cultural	Center,	was	the	 preceding	 political	 protests,	 occupations,	 and	 demonstrations	 surrounding	 the	
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threatened	Gezi	Park,	which	was	to	be	destroyed	to	make	way	for	a	shopping	center.	The	police	 responded	 heavy-handedly	 and	 a	 ban	 on	 public	 gatherings	 was	 announced,	including	any	kind	of	movement	as	part	of	a	demonstration.	Gündüz’s	 reaction	was	 to	organize	 the	 act	 of	 standing	 on	 the	 square.	 Because	 it	 was	 not	 forbidden	 for	 an	individual	to	do	this,	it	undermined	police	regulations.	Those	whose	job	it	was	to	enforce	these	 regulations	 did	 not	 know	 how	 to	 deal	 appropriately	 with	 an	 act	 that	 was	 so	fundamentally	ordinary.		 This	 raises	 the	 particular	 question	 of	 from	 when,	 or	 in	 which	 moment,	 a	movement	–	 in	this	case	an	everyday	gesture,	namely	standing	and	waiting	–	becomes	political.	 Several	 clues	may	 be	 drawn	 from	 this	 act.	 Firstly,	 there	 is	 the	 length	 of	 the	action,	which	exceeds	that	of	a	usual	waiting	situation	–	and	yet,	how	long	can	a	person	wait	while	still	functioning	within	the	social	framework	of	everyday	gestures?	How	long	is	 needed	 to	 convert	 an	 ordinary	 event	 in	 a	 public	 space	 into	 an	 unusual	 one?	 The	question	 of	 temporality	 is	 therefore	 connected	 to	 that	 of	 space,	 and	 in	 this	 instance	particularly	 the	 alternative	 use	 of	 public	 space	 as	 signified	 by	 the	 length	 of	 time	 for	which	 it	 is	 used.	 Erdem	 Gündüz	 is,	 as	 already	 mentioned,	 a	 performer	 and	choreographer,	 trained	 among	 other	 things	 in	 the	 methods	 of	 contemporary	 dance	movement.1	 Here,	 I	 would	 suggest	 that	 artistic	 practice	 is	 migrating	 into	 temporary	forms	of	political	protest.	Gündüz’s	act	could	therefore	be	described	as	artistic,	perhaps	through	the	idea	of	the	slowing	or	the	stilling	of	movement,	or	in	the	use	of	public	space	as	a	place	of	portrayal,	as	site-specific	performance,	if	you	will.	The	aspects	of	physical	action	and	its	production	and	performance	in	an	urban	place	consequently	denote	and	realize	three	overlapping	spheres:	the	artistic,	the	public	everyday	life,	and	the	political.	How	and	when	these	fields	stray	into	the	boundaries	of	the	others	is	the	subject	of	the	following	discussion.	
 Acts	of	Slowing	Down	As	 a	 performer	 and	 choreographer,	 Gündüz	 principally	 makes	 use	 of	 established	methods	 of	 contemporary	 dance,	 one	 being	 the	 process	 of	 deceleration,	 which	 for	Gündüz	 ends	 in	 maintaining	 an	 almost	 motionless	 position	 in	 the	 location.	 André	Lepecki	 sees	 not	 only	 the	 act	 of	 standing	 (apparently)	 still	 but	 also	 the	 mode	 of	deceleration	 as	 a	 practice	 of	 contemporary	 dance	which	 is	 bound	 up	with	 critique	 of	representation.	Using	 the	 example	 of	 choreographer	 Jérôme	Bel,	 Lepecki	 formulates	 a	“slower	 ontology”,	 which	 is	 externally	 expressed	 through	 the	 stilling	 of	 movement	
 3	
(Lepecki	2006,	45,	57).	A	“deflation	of	movement”	does	not,	however,	represent	a	denial	of	 dance	 as	movement,	 placing	 this	 instead	within	 the	 internal	 structure	 of	 the	 body	itself,	as	in	the	piece	Jérôme	Bel	(1995):	“[Bel]	deploys	stillness	and	slowness	to	propose	how	 movement	 is	 not	 only	 a	 question	 of	 kinetics,	 but	 also	 one	 of	 intensities,	 of	generating	an	intensive	field	of	microperceptions.”	(Lepecki	2001,	57)	Even	earlier,	Lepecki	emphasizes	the	very	idea	of	standing	still	as	an	interruption	of	the	perpetual	river	of	time,	a	suspension	of	temporal	flow,	as	he	demonstrates,	for	instance,	with	 reference	 to	 Jérôme	 Bel’s	 The	 Last	 Performance	 (1998)	 (Lepecki	 2001,	 44	 ff.).	Together	with	anthropologist	Nadia	Seremetakis,	Lepecki	expresses	these	“still	acts”	as	“[s]tanding	 still	 against	 the	 busy	 background	 of	 historical	 agitation”,	 as	 remaining	motionless	in	the	face	of	an	(aesthetic)	modernity	which	has	aligned	itself	with	progress	(Lepecki	2001,	44).			 To	return	to	Gündüz,	he	converts	a	similar	aesthetic	slowing	and	stopping,	also	oriented	 towards	postmodern	movement	practices	of	 standing	still,2	 into	a	moment	of	still-standing-there	 as	 Duran	 Adam,	 in	 spite	 of	 police	 restrictions	 and	 the	 ban	 on	demonstrating:	 a	 political	 application	 of	 artistic	 methods	 which	 is	 an	 early	 nod	 to	Lepecki’s	 paraphrase	 of	 Seremetakis’	 theses	 (Ertem	 2014).3	 Protest	 is	 made	 possible	precisely	because	there	is	no	longer	a	demonstration	on	the	march,	or	in	motion:	this	is	an	act	of	standing	still	against	an	anti-democratic	regime,	so	to	speak.		 I	 would	 now	 like	 to	 look	 once	 again,	 and	more	 closely,	 at	 the	 question	 of	 the	moment	of	transition:	firstly	the	transition	of	an	everyday	act	–	standing	and	waiting	–	into	an	artistic	act,	and	finally	into	an	alternative,	legal	form	of	resistance.	The	decisive	question	 here	 seems	 to	 me	 to	 be	 when	 and	 how	 exactly	 artistic	 practice	 –	 or,	 more	precisely,	choreography	–	becomes	a	medium	of	protest;	or,	following	Niklas	Luhmann,	when	does	the	act	of	the	artist	Erdem	Gündüz	become	a	medium	which	communicates	protest?	First,	it	is	important	to	clarify	the	theoretical	outlines	of	the	medial	and/as	art	within	the	conceptual	field	of	communication.	In	addition	to	this,	the	medial	movement	of	 transfer	 between	 everyday	 gestures,	 art,	 and	 the	 political	 will	 be	 considered	 once	again	in	greater	detail	through	the	application	of	another	example	from	choreography.		Art	as	Medium	For	 the	 following	discussion,	 I	will	briefly	put	aside	 the	notion	of	 the	autonomy	of	art	and	 the	 subsequent	 possibility	 of	 never	 fully	 comprehensible	 aesthetic	 surpluses,	 and	take	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 Niklas	 Luhmann’s	 thoughts	 on	 the	 mediality	 and	 also	 the	
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communicability	of	art.	First,	however,	a	few	words	on	Luhmann’s	theoretical	concept.	From	the	perspective	of	systems	theory,	sociologist	Niklas	Luhmann	outlines	a	different	view	of	social	phenomena	and	the	epistemological	implications	inherent	in	them,	which	he	juxtaposes	with	ontological	or	essentialist	theories:	“Indicate	the	system	from	which	you	want	to	observe	the	world,	draw	a	distinction,	and	distinguish	yourself	 from	what	you	observe	while	acknowledging	the	autological	implication	that	the	same	holds	when	you	observe	yourself	(rather	than	the	external	world)”	(Luhmann	2000,	51).		The	 operations	 described	 do	 not	 consistently	 take	 place	 on	 the	 level	 of	 subjective	decisions,	 but	 are	 always	 connected	 to	 the	 self-referentiality	 of	 the	 system	 concerned	and	 its	 internal	 objects:	 “‘For	 itself’	 means	 independent	 of	 the	 cut	 of	 observation	 by	others”	 (Luhmann	 1995,	 32-33).	 This	 inclusive	 nature	 of	 systems’	 constitutions	 is	important,	 and	 is	 elucidated	by	 Luhmann	using	 the	 term	autopoiesis.	 It	may	be,	 then,	that	 systems	 (linguistic,	 for	 instance,	but	also	ecological)	do	not	only	exist	 in	 the	pure	mode	 of	 repetition,	 but	 are	 in	 fact	 always	 constituted	 in	 a	 recursive	 way:	 “It	 is	 not	enough	 […]	 to	 repeat	 what	 has	 been	 said	 […]	 once	 it	 dies	 away.	 Something	 else,	something	 new	 must	 follow,	 for	 the	 informational	 component	 of	 communication	presupposes	surprise	and	gets	lost	in	repetition”	(Luhmann	2000,	49-50).		 The	described	self-referentiality	is	always	preceded	first	of	all	by	a	differentiation	operation	 between,	 respectively,	 that	 which	 belongs	 to	 the	 system	 and	 that	 which	surrounds	it	(“environment”):	
 Systems	 are	 oriented	 by	 their	 environment	 not	 just	 occasionally	 and	adaptively,	but	structurally	and	they	cannot	exist	without	an	environment.	They	 constitute	 and	maintain	 themselves	 by	 creating	 and	maintaining	 a	difference	 from	 their	 environment,	 and	 they	 use	 their	 boundaries	 to	regulate	this	difference	(Luhmann	1995,	16-17).	
 In	 this,	 communication	 is	 a	 key	 element	 in	 the	 differentiation	 and	 constitution	 of,	 for	instance,	 social	 systems	 (Luhmann	1995,	19-20).	This,	 along	with	 the	characteristic	of	self-referentiality,	 characterizes	 systems	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 as	 restricted	 and	 strictly	differentiated	from	others	(Luhmann	1995,	37,	39);	and	yet	systems,	through	their	very	distinctiveness,	 are	 able	 to	 connect	 to	 other	 systems	 and	 environments	 and	 also	 to	‘shape’	them:	
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The	 concept	of	 a	 self-referentially	 closed	 system	does	not	 contradict	 the	system’s	openness	to	the	environment.	Instead,	in	the	self-referential	mode	of	 operation,	 closure	 is	 a	 form	 of	 broadening	 possible	 environmental	contacts;	closure	increases	[…]	the	complexity	of	the	environment	that	is	possible	for	the	system	(Luhmann	1995,	37).		
 With	this,	Luhmann	is	also	subverting	the	idea	of	the	classical	dichotomy	of	‘inside’	and	‘outside’	(Luhmann	1995,	37).			 Within	 the	 theoretical	 field	 of	 systems	 theory,	 Luhmann	 then	 expresses	 the	possibility	of	situating	art	as	a	system	of	communication	–	although	he	definitely	agrees	to	 the	 autonomy	 of	 art	 and	 its	 occasional	withdrawal	 from	hermeneutic	 systems	 as	 a	polysemy	(Luhmann	2000,	40).	It	is	of	primary	importance	for	the	link	developing	here	that	 art,	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 language,	 can	 communicate	 just	 like	 these	 “structural	coupling[s]	 of	 systems	 of	 consciousness	 and	 social	 systems”	 (Luhmann	 1992,	 67-68).	Indeed,	modern	art	(by	which	he	means	the	avant-garde	concepts	of	1960s	visual	art)	does	 in	 a	 way	 subvert	 and	 toy	 with	 the	 expectations	 held	 by	 the	 viewers	 (Luhmann	1986,	13).	This	however	presupposes	“socially	constituted	expectations”:		 		for	instance,	that	writing	must	be	legible,	and	music	recognizable	as	such,	that	is,	distinguishable	from	noises,	or	even	more	simply:	that	that	which	we	encounter	in	concert	halls,	literary	texts,	museums,	etc.,	is	art.	Without	the	establishment	of	such	expectations	[…]	art	would	no	longer	be	able	to	reproduce	 itself;	 it	 would	 leak	 into	 the	 everyday	 and	 trickle	 away	(Luhmann	1986,	11).	
 What	 is	particularly	 enlightening	here	 is,	 among	other	 things,	 the	distinction	between	art	and	the	everyday	which	becomes	so	blurred	in	the	example	of	Duran	Adam.	Before	we	go	into	this,	let	us	return	once	more	to	Luhmann’s	concept	of	media.		 Luhmann	defines	media	as	an	ensemble	of	multiple	elements	bound	together	by	“loose	coupling[s]”	and	which	display	an	“easy	separability”	(Luhmann	1986,	7)	–	as,	for	instance,	 in	 the	 verbal	 system	of	 letters,	words,	 language.	 Art	 as	 a	medium,	 Luhmann	says,	is	based	first	of	all	on	“primary	media”	such	as	sound	and	visibility,	and	then	forms	a	“second	level	medium”,	in	which	music,	for	example,	is	only	recognizable	as	such	when	it	 complies	with	 particular	 principles	 of	 composition	 and	 is	 also	 distinguishable	 from	
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mere	 everyday	 sounds	 (Luhmann	 1986,	 8).	 Luhmann	 eventually	 describes	 art’s	(various)	expressive	methods	as	“form”	and,	regarding	music,	 states,	 “[w]hile	sound	 is	usually	heard	as	a	difference	from	quiet	and	therefore	noticed,	music	presupposes	this	attention	 and	 forces	 it	 to	 observe	 a	 second	 difference:	 that	 of	 medium	 and	 form”	(Luhamnn	 1986,	 9).	 Through	 the	 loose	 connections	 of	 a	 wide	 and	 complex	 range	 of	elements,	“zones	of	possibility”	in	and	for	art	come	into	being	(Luhmann	1986,	9).		 According	 to	Luhmann,	 form	 is	not	 linked	 to	 a	 separation	of	 form	and	 content.	Instead,	 form,	 through	 the	 aforementioned	 first	 operation,	 that	 of	 differentiation,	becomes	 recognizable	 as	 a	 certain	 constitution,	 as	 a	 state	 of	 being	 like-this-and-no-other-way	which	demarcates	one	form	from	another;	but	also	as	what	he	calls	a	“figure”	[Gestalt],	meaning	a	“unity”:	[T]he	concept	of	form	[…]	extends	and	places	on	the	‘other	side’	 of	 form	 the	 realm	 of	what	 used	 to	 be	 considered	 chance	 and	 thereby	 subsumes	under	the	concept	of	form	any	difference	that	marks	a	unity“	(Luhmann	2000,	27).		 In	his	conception	of	a	relationship	between	medium	and	form,	Luhmann	is	not,	of	course,	 talking	 about	 theatre,	 dance,	 or	 performance	 art;	 the	 performing	 arts	 in	particular,	 if	 this	 model	 were	 applied,	 would	 appear	 extremely	 complex	 one	 would	conclude,	as	they	are	formed	of	primary	media,	and	their	respective	forms	(such	as	the	dramatic	text)	that	are	essentially	loosely	coupled	media	of	the	third	level,	so	to	speak.	This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 theatre	 is	 a	 conglomerate	 of	 various	 other	 ‘first’	 arts.	 In	 fact,	theatre	 seems	 to	 reinforce	 Luhmann’s	 idea	 of	 art	 as	 a	 medium:	 after	 all,	 it	 creates	 a	complex	 entity	 of	 the	most	 diverse	medial	 forms	of	 expression,	which,	 for	 certain	 on-stage	moments,	combine	with	varying	degrees	of	regularity,	but	can	then	separate	once	again	just	as	quickly.	To	illustrate	this,	one	need	only	think	of	a	 ‘classical’	example	like	opera,	 in	 which	 music,	 acting	 and	 occasionally	 dance	 and	 further	 elements	 come	together.	 In	 this	context,	Luhmann’s	concept	of	a	 temporality	of	systems	also	becomes	understandable.	The	temporality	is	essentially	inherent	in	them,	in	the	form	of	a	genuine	“restlessness”	 and	 instability	 which	 make	 possible	 the	 necessary	 change	 within	 the	systems	(Luhmann	1995,	50,	41-42).	Luhmann,	meanwhile,	 also	 has	 one	 eye	 on	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 the	 arts	 and	states	that	art	creates	its	own	media.	He	sees	these	of	course	in	relation	to	social	reality,	which	 he	 portrays	 as	 a	 continuous	 process.	 The	 arts	 of	 the	 medieval	 period	 still	displayed	 “rigid	 forms,	 oriented	 towards	 stereotypes”,	 but	 the	 art	 of	 the	 19th	 century	showed	 “tendencies	 to	 embrace	 social	 facts’	 great	 capability	 of	 dissolution	 and	recombination”	(Luhmann	1986,	10-11).	
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If,	then,	society	is	constituted	through	communication,	it	follows	that	(political)	protest	situations	represent	one	of	its	media	of	communication.	And	if,	following	Luhmann	once	again,	 art	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 system	 of	 communication	 that,	 through	 loosely	coupled	media,	 takes	 on	 diverging,	 temporally	 marked	 forms	 of	 display	 –	 like	Duran	
Adam	as	a	coupling	of	(public)	space,	the	body,	and	(im)mobility	–	then	I	would	suggest	that	loose	couplings	can	also	be	envisaged	between	daily	life,	art,	and	political	protest.	In	Luhmann’s	 terms,	 this	 would	 for	 instance	 mean	 that	 systems,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 are	strictly	distinct	from	one	another;	on	the	other	hand,	however,	transfers	between	these	different	 fields	 can	 happen	 comparatively	 easily,	 because,	 in	 certain	 situations,	 their	margins	 are	 relatively	 open	 and	 loose,	 and	 can	 at	 any	 time	 connect	 to	 other	 system	constellations.	 This	 happens	 especially,	 I	 think,	 in	 situations	 in	 which	 the	 marginal	conditions	are	shifted	or	unclear:	what,	for	instance,	is	Duran	Adam	doing	in	the	eyes	of	the	 advancing	 and	 indecisive	 police?	 Is	 he	 simply	 standing	 there?	 Is	 he	 waiting	 for	something?	 Might	 this	 possibly	 be	 a	 piece	 of	 art?	 Or	 even	 a	 political	 protest?	 If	 yes,	however,	what	form	could	this	have	taken	within	the	Turkish	police’s	sphere	of	control?		 Regarding	art,	Luhmann	expresses	the	questioning	of	one’s	own	perception	of	art	as	 “What	do	 I	 see?	Am	 I	 seeing	 correctly	what	 I	 see?”	 (Luhmann	2000,	40).	To	 return	once	again	to	the	aforementioned	separation	of	the	everyday	and	the	artistic,	described	by	Luhmann,	we	may	well	agree	with	Luhmann	that	the	dividing	line	between	the	two	apparently	cannot	be	drawn	too	strictly	–	and	not	just	in	postmodern	art.	This	seems	to	raise	the	question	of	why	Luhmann,	who	after	all	defines	the	loose	connections	between	systems	 through	 their	 distinctions,	maintains	 this	 differentiation	 between	 art	 and	 the	everyday	 at	 all.	Modernist	 art	 provides	 an	 early	 demonstration	 in	Marcel	Duchamps’s	readymades	 –	 of	 which	 the	 Fountain	 (1917)	 is	 a	 famous	 example	 –	 of	 an	 object	experiencing	 uncoupling	 and	 re-coupling	 through	 spatial	 relocation	 and	decontextualization:	out	of	 the	realm	of	 the	everyday,	and	 into	 the	sphere	of	 so-called	High	Culture	in	an	art	gallery.	Elsewhere,	Luhmann	emphasizes	the	‘exchange	potential’	of	 profane,	 everyday	 objects	 in	 an	 artistic	 setting,	 exemplified	 in	 Duchamps’s	 famous	example	 as	 a	 breaking	 away	 from	 art’s	 conventional	 criteria;	 he	 restricts	 himself,	however,	as	generally,	primarily	 to	the	 field	of	 the	visual	arts.	Duchamps,	according	to	Luhmann,	was	directly	playing	with	the	idea	of	the	difference	between	the	everyday	and	the	artistic	and	connecting	the	questionable	possibility	of	a	distinction	to	 this,	 thereby	actually	using	“the	form	of	a	work	of	art”	(Luhmann	2000,	34).	
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If	we	return	to	Luhmann’s	differentiation	between	music	and	sounds,	mentioned	earlier,	we	can	notice	 that	 John	Cage’s	 famous	experimental	piece	4’33	 (1952),	 for	 instance,	 is	entirely	 about	 calling	 this	 distinction	 into	 question	 and,	 in	 the	 intended	 absence	 of	(composed)	 music,	 experiencing	 the	 sounds	 and	 noises	 of	 the	 concert	 hall	 as	 a	composition	 of	 the	moment	 –	 here,	we	 could	 ask	 once	 again	 how	 strictly	 Luhmann	 is	defining	 his	 concept	 of	 a	 composition,	 considering	 that	 he,	 as	 outlined	 above,	 almost	speaks	 of	 music	 as	 an	 art	 form	 which	 can	 be	 distinctly	 differentiated	 from	 everyday	sounds.	Luhmann	also	notes	that	“non-art”	is	always	a	component	of	art,	as	the	“material	can	also	be	applied	differently”	(Luhmann	1992,	71).	However,	he	stands	by	his	notion	that	 art	 always	 begins	 in	 its	 communicative	 function,	 while	 juxtaposing,	 as	 a	 core	concept,	 a	 certain	 artistic	 voluntarism	 of	 display	 with	 a	 fundamental	 openness	 to	reception	in	the	viewer	(Luhmann	1992,	70).		 Now,	 how	 can	 Luhmann’s	 ideas	 on	 the	 mediality	 –	 and	 therefore	 genuine	sociability	–	of	art	be	applied	to	the	example	of	Duran	Adam?	The	moment	of	standing	still	on	 the	square	 is,	 first	of	all,	not	a	genuine	artistic	act	 in	 itself,	 rather	an	everyday	activity	which	can	indeed	last	some	time,	as	said	earlier:	waiting	for	a	bus,	a	(delayed)	meeting,	 or	 similar.	 The	 context,	 however,	 relocates	 the	 everyday	 into	 a	 different	system:	that	of	art	and	politics.	The	standing	element,	which,	in	Luhmann’s	terms	would	be	understood	as	 a	primary	medium,	has	now	been	 coupled,	 although	not	necessarily	straight	away	within	a	composition	or	similar	format	that	would	confine	it	to	an	artistic	framework.	The	starting	point	 is	a	conscious	decision	on	Gündüz’s	part:	 to	stand	right	here	 on	 this	 spot	 and	 not	 to	move,	with	 eyes	 fixed	 on	 the	Atatürk	 Cultural	 Center.	 In	doing	 this,	 Gündüz	 opens	 up	 two	 systems	 at	 the	 same	 time:	 firstly,	 the	 artistic.	 As	 a	performer,	he	chooses	the	act	of	standing,	which	represents	a	historical	allusion	to	the	methods	of	New	York’s	Judson	Church	protagonists	in	its	drawing	of	the	everyday	into	art.	In	political	terms,	Gündüz’s	act	is	a	silent	protest	against	the	Istanbul	police’s	ban	on	demonstrations.	The	act	of	standing	also	becomes	a	joining	point	for	diverging	systems	which,	here,	are	communicating	with	each	other.		 Erdem	Gündüz,	as	already	mentioned,	is	a	performer	and	choreographer.	As	such,	he	has	chosen	a	political	step:	the	gesture	of	standing.	The	question	now	is	whether	the	act	of	standing	 in	 itself	already	constitutes	the	medium	which	connects	to	the	systems	described.	 Is	 it	 not	 also	 an	 artistic	 “form”,	 as	 Luhmann	would	 put	 it	 –	 a	 second	 level	medium	 –	which,	 as	 choreography,	 like	 composition	 in	music,	 creates	 the	 connection	
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between	the	everyday,	the	artistic,	and	the	political,	and	enables	exchange	between	the	three,	now	indistinguishable	for	the	irritated	policemen?	In	the	end,	Luhmann	states	that	the	aspect	of	form	becomes	fungible	within	boundaries,	and	that	this	would	be	visible	in	the	medium:	
 The	work	of	art	draws	on	sensuously	perceptible	media	 for	 its	own	self-explication,	no	matter	what	is	subsequently	presented	as	an	internal	play	of	forms.	[…]	The	concept	of	form	suggests	that	two	requirements	must	be	fulfilled	 and	 inscribed	 into	 perception:	 the	 form	must	 have	 a	 boundary,	and	 there	 must	 be	 an	 ‘unmarked’	 space	 excluded	 by	 this	 boundary	(Luhmann	2000,	45).	
 In	this	case,	the	unmarked	is	not	to	be	understood	as	the	other,	the	asymbolic.	Instead,	an	asymmetry	comes	into	being	in	the	moment	in	which	the	decision	is	taken	to	make	a	distinction	 in	 a	particular	direction	 (Luhmann	2000,	42),	 perhaps	 the	direction	 to	 see	something	“as	art”	(Luhmann	2000,	39).	In	the	case	of	Erdem	Gündüz’	act	of	standing,	it	could	be	 said	 that	 the	 systems	have	 failed.	After	 all,	 the	police	do	not	know	how	 they	should	deal	with	 this	 situation:	 they	 simply	 are	not	 able	 to	 reach	 a	 decision	 and,	 to	 a	certain	extent,	fall	prey	to	a	system	failure.		 To	what	extent	may	choreography	here,	and	the	choreographic	decision	to	stand	on	 the	square,	be	characterized	as	a	system-transcending	 (in	 this	case)	medium	of	art	and	protest?	To	approach	this	question,	I	would	like	to	consider	a	second	example.		  
Constructing	Resilience	Between	2011	and	2012,	the	Israeli	German-based	choreographer	Ehud	Darash	carried	out	 a	 series	 of	 interventions	 in	 public	 spaces.	 He	 started	 in	 Tel	 Aviv,	where,	working	with	a	succession	of	dancers,	he	immersed	himself	in	the	subject	currently	focusing	the	population’s	 political	 protest,	 namely	 social	 justice	 and	 affordable	 housing;	 one	 year	later,	he	continued	his	work	within	the	context	of	Occupy	Wall	Street.4	If	demonstrations	or	protests	are	generally	characterized	either	by	striving	for	progress	or	the	opposite,	a	tactic	 of	 blocking	 or	 occupying	 (as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 tents	 put	 up	 on	 Tel	 Aviv’s	expensive	Rothschild	Boulevard),	then	Darash	and	his	allies	initiated	a	literal	example	of	the	latter:	in	the	midst	of	the	protesting	crowds,	singing	and	shouting	slogans,	on	street	corners,	 or	 even	 between	 the	 tents	 of	 political	 activists,	 five	 or	 six	 dancers	 on	 each	
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occasion	performed	very	small	movements.	Starting	from	a	standing	position,	similar	to	the	 later	Duran	 Adam,	 they	would	 gradually	 slump	 down	 into	 themselves,	 until	 their	bodies’	 strength	 gave	 out	 and	 they	 fell	 to	 the	 ground.	 In	 this,	 the	 usual	 protest	 act	 of	standing-for-something	turned	into	its	opposite.		 It	is	of	course	very	much	possible	to	be	critical	of	this,	and	ask	whether	an	artistic	act	of	this	type	was	merely	pretentious	in	the	face	of	the	social	engagement	of	those	who	were	demanding	better	living	conditions	in	such	numbers	on	the	streets.	The	question	is	whether	an	action	like	this	actually	creates	political	awareness	or	rather	remains	in	the	sphere	of	a	purely	artistic	project,	which	is	using	the	described	counter-public	as	a	place	of	 experimentation.	 At	 this	 point,	 however,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 concentrate	 on	 the	functioning	of	the	choreographical	as	a	possible	medium	of	protest:	not	so	much	in	the	sense	of	a	 (difficult	 to	determine)	effect	aesthetic,	but	rather	with	a	view	to	structural	organization	and	transfers	of	(system)	elements	which	fluctuate	between	the	everyday,	the	 artistic,	 and	 the	 political.	 Luhmann	 states,	 “[a]s	 soon	 as	 boundaries	 are	 defined	sharply,	 elements	 must	 be	 attributed	 either	 to	 the	 system	 or	 the	 environment”	(Luhmann	1995,	28).	As	already	shown	through	Duran	Adam,	elements	like	this	can	be	temporarily	uncoupled	and	cause	difficulties	in	the	differentiation	and	placing	of	and	in	systems.		Articulated	with	André	 Lepecki,	 there	 already	 seems	 be	 to	 a	 connection	 between	 the	slowing	down	 strategies	 of	 contemporary	 avant-garde	dance	 and	 a	politically-charged	choreographic	riposte	to	the	ideology	of	standing	straight	–	a	connection	which	Lepecki	describes	as	genuinely	“ontopolitical”	 (Lepecki	2006,	88).5	 In	 this	regard,	Darash’s	act,	whether	intentional	or	not,	is	already	political	because	it	initiates	a	counter-movement	on	the	stage	of	 the	aforementioned	protests.	More	 important	at	 this	point,	however,	 is	the	question	of	where	exactly	the	systems	of	the	everyday,	the	artistic,	and	the	political	converge	 and	 become	 connected,	 and	 I	 would	 suggest	 that	 this	 takes	 place	 in	 the	choreography	 itself,	 which	 becomes	 a	 medium	 of	 protest	 for	 Erdem	 Gündüz,	 and	 for	Darash	 at	 least	 creates	 the	 potential	 for	 this.	 Once	 again,	movements	 are	 being	 taken	from	the	realm	of	the	everyday	–	in	this	case	a	stylized	form	of	sinking	down	or	falling	–	and	 transformed	 first	 of	 all	 into	 an	 artistic,	 choreographic	 act	 which	 –	 against	 the	background	of	political	events	–	may	develop	into	a	protest	movement.		 Following	 Andrew	 Hewitt,	 Gabriele	 Klein	 reformulates	 the	 idea	 of	 “social	choreography”:	 choreography,	 according	 to	 Klein,	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 “a	performative	structuring	of	body	practices	in	time	and		space,	as	an	analytical	category	
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that	 allows	 reflection	 of	 the	 social,	 as	well	 as	 exposing	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	aesthetic	 and	 the	 political”	 (Klein	 2013,	 198).	 Ehud	 Darash’s	 concept	 is	 primarily	artistic,	and	consciously	 integrates	elements	of	contemporary	dance,	such	as	slowness.	These	acts	may	however,	to	refer	to	Luhmann	once	again,	be	regarded	as	socio-political	interventions	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 described	 events	 –	 or	 even	 be	 discarded	 as	inappropriate	artistic	self-indulgence.	Are	there	any	indicators	here	that	could	enable	an	appropriate	‘registration’?			 At	 the	beginning	of	his	book,	Randy	Martin,	discussing	 the	connection	between	dance	and	politics,	emphasizes	the	moment	of	mobilization	as	a	decisive	binding	factor	of	dance	and/as	political	movement:		
 [T]hrough	mobilization,	bodies	traverse	a	given	terrain	that	by	traversing,	they	constitute.	[…]	Mobilization	foregrounds	th[e]	process	of	how	bodies	are	made,	how	they	are	assembled,	and	how	demands	for	space	produce	a	space	 of	 identifiable	 demands	 through	 a	 practical	 activity	 (Martin	 1998,	4).	
 Here,	 then,	Martin	opts	 for	a	performative	manifestation	of	 space	as	mobilization,	and	not	only	mere	movement.	Rather:	 “If	movement	can	be	plotted	on	a	grid	of	 space	and	time,	mobilization	is	what	generates	the	grid”,	to	use	Martin’s	words	(Martin	1998,	4).	In	Luhmann’s	 terms,	 mobilization	 would	 be	 an	 element	 which	 primarily	 enabled	movement	 (as	 a	 medium).	 Dance,	 to	 return	 to	 Martin,	 then	 becomes	 the	 “embodied	practice”	which	gathers	bodies	for	a	particular,	 literal	time-space	(Martin	1998,	4)	and	is,	 in	 this	 regard,	 truly	 to	be	considered	within	social	dynamics:	 “[D]ance	 is	 treated	as	the	reflexive	mobilization	of	the	body	–	that	is,	as	a	social	process	that	foregrounds	the	very	means	through	which	bodies	gather”	(Martin	1998,	5),	and	this	in	specific	historical	constellations	(Martin	1998,	24).			 Dance-movement	 could	 be	 classified,	 according	 to	 Luhmann,	 as	 a	 first	 level	medium	 to	 which	 choreography,	 as	 a	 second,	 connects;	 or,	 as	 Martin	 puts	 it:	 “dance	emerges	 through	 the	mobilization	of	participation	 in	 relation	 to	a	choreographic	 idea”	(Martin	1998,	4).	Both	space	and	time	are	then,	according	to	Martin	as	quoted	above,	not	simply	given,	but	must	be	developed:	re-placed	 in	movement,	they	are	created	through	this	very	act	and	become	observable.	This	raises	the	question,	however,	of	whether	the	Luhmannian	model	–	which,	when	applied	to	music	for	instance,	sees	sound	as	the	first	
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and	 composition	 as	 the	 second	medium	 –	 can	 simply	 be	 carried	 over	without	 further	work.	 In	Martin’s	 view,	 after	 all,	 choreography	 in	not	 simply	 an	 instrument	or	 artistic	format	 which	 brings	 the	 dance-movement	 together.	 In	 order	 to	 comprehend	 this,	Martin’s	truly	political	understanding	of	dance	must	first	be	outlined.	For	 him,	 movement	 and	 mobilization	 serve	 as	 key	 concepts	 which	 couple	 dance	 (as	“embodied	 practice”)	 and	 politics	 (Martin	 1998,	 5).	 Consequently,	 the	 origins	 of	 the	political	 would	 lie	 in	 the	 very	 moment	 of	 setting-something-in-motion	 and	 would	 be	closely	 linked	to	 this.	However,	according	 to	 this	 idea,	any	mobilization	at	all	could	be	viewed	 as	 a	 political	 act.	 Martin	 does	 clarify	 his	 ideas,	 and	 places	 his	 theorem	 of	mobilization	within	a	triangle	of	dance,	choreography,	and	participation.	The	concept	of	participation	 contributes	 particularly	 to	 understanding	 the	 connection	 between	movement	 and	 politics.	 Referring	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 dance	 as	 a	 performing	 art,	 Martin	reformulates	 the	 idea	of	participation	as	a	 fundamentally	social	structure	which	arises	between	the	audience	and	the	performers	in	the	performance	setting.	He	attaches	this,	among	other	things,	to	the	moment	of	the	end	of	a	performance,	which	is	ultimately	set	by	the	audience’s	decision	as	to	whether	the	dance	(as	an	artistic	event)	is	now	over:	
 Was	that	the	dance?	By	initiating	this	common	reflective	activity	on	what	has	just	transpired,	the	audience	imposes	a	direct	physical	imperative	on	the	 dancers,	 an	 authority	 that	 until	 now	 was	 reserved	 for	 the	choreographer.	[…]	the	audience	decides	that	the	dance	is	complete	[and]	[w]hat	 the	 choreographer	 began	 –	 getting	 dancers	 to	 move	 with	something	in	mind	–	the	audience	here	continues	(Martin	1998,	33).	
 Regardless	of	 the	question	of	whether	choreography	is	actually	merely	to	be	seen	as	a	set	of	preformed	compositional	ideas,	it	is	fundamental	for	the	link	unfolding	here	that	the	audience	undertakes	a	(Luhmannian,	when	seen	like	this)	distinction	and	grants	the	event	 the	 status	 of	 (artistic)	 dance(dancing).	 Consequently,	 the	 audience	 is	 an	indispensable	 component	 and,	 what	 is	 more,	 participates	 in	 the	 event	 as	 a	 social	process:	 “the	 very	 participation	 of	 performers	 and	 audience	 […]	 made	 the	 event	possible.”	 (Martin	 1998,	 36)6	 Via	 Erika	 Fischer-Lichte’s	 idea	 that	 co-presence	 is	 a	necessary	 constitutional	 condition,7	Martin	 grants	 the	 audience	 an	 active	 position	 not	only	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 a	 physical	 and	 atmospheric	 presence,	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 temporary	
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authority	which	takes	on	authorship	of	the	ending	and	therefore	draws	the	distinction	between	dance	and	no-longer-dance.		 This	 constellation	 is	 not,	 however	 –	 and	 this	 is	 important	 for	 the	 topic	 being	discussed	here	–	to	be	viewed	as	a	stable	entity	of	socio-artistic	activity.	Instead,	this	is	a	matter	of	thoroughly	unstable	levels	which	constantly	need	to	be	re-actualized	or	could	slip	out	of	their	categorization:	
 The	 audience	 has	 no	 identity	 as	 audience	 prior	 to	 and	 apart	 from	 the	performative	 agency	 that	 has	 occasioned	 it.	 As	 such,	 the	 audience	 is	intrinsically	 “unstable”	 […]	 [t]he	 uncertainty,	 the	 indeterminacy	 of	performance,	 is	 momentarily	 actualized	 by	 the	 audience	 and	 therefore	itself	disrupted	(Martin	1998,	38).	
 When	considered,	once	again,	 through	Luhmann’s	medium	theory,	 the	aforementioned	medial	 first	 and	 second	 levels	 –	 movement/dance	 and	 choreography	 –	 can	 now	 be	expanded	via	Randy	Martin	with	the	fundamental	component	of	the	audience.	Decisions	in	 and	 about	 media	 would	 consequently	 not	 be	 superordinate	 or	 superpersonal	categories,	but	would	always	be	bound	up	with	operations	of	distinct	processes,	which	could	be	completely	 fluid	–	an	artistic	 (choreographic)	act	can	arise	 from	an	everyday	one,	and	then	be	transformed	again	into	a	political	one.	As	a	result,	choreography	alone	would	not	be	the	medium	that	determined	the	respective	everyday,	artistic,	or	political	perspective,	but	rather	the	particular	loose	references	within	the	dance-choreography-participation	triangle	described	by	Martin,	which	could	cause	every	mobilization	to	slide	into	one	or	another	sphere.		 That	 which	 Martin	 describes	 as	 the	 audience	 also	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	examples	 considered	here,	 particularly	 in	 the	moments	 of	 uncertainty	 experienced	by	the	police	when	faced	with	Erdem	Gündüz’	performance,	notably	in	the	demarcation	and	classification	of	events	–	which	Luhmann,	as	mentioned	previously,	explains	in	the	form	of	 “boundaries”8.	This	marks	people	 taking	part	 in	 the	situation	as	 the	 “audience”:	 the	police,	 who	 stand	 there	 partly	 insecurely	 and	 do	 not,	 so	 to	 speak,	 grasp	 the	 power	offered	to	them	–	and	yet	unwittingly	take	part	in	the	action	in	that	they	are	unable	to	take	 the	measure	 of	 Gündüz	 in	 the	 normal	way,	 but	 simply	 stand	 around	 him	 rather	helplessly,	 shrugging	 their	 shoulders,	 cautious	 and	 uncertain.	 The	 otherwise	 regular	conduct	 of	 the	police	 is	 suspended	 through	Gündüz’s	 behavior,	which	 is	 so	unclear	 to	
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them,	and	as	a	result	they	become,	rather	unwillingly,	participants	 in	his	protest.	They	don’t	 wish	 to	 interrupt	 it	 because	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 to	 them	 whether	 anything	 illegal	 is	taking	place:	they	leave	him	as	he	is.	Here,	mobilization	literally	creates	demobilization:	the	 impossibility	 of	 removing	 Gündüz,	 and	 the	 impossibility	 of	 doing	 nothing	 –	 the	normal	police	process	becomes	virtually	pointless.		 In	 Martin’s	 terms,	 we	 could	 talk	 in	 this	 case	 about	 an	 unstable,	 unsettled	audience,	which	is	unable	to	take	on	authorship	of	the	end	of	the	performance	because,	to	return	 to	Luhmann	once	again,	 it	 is	not	clear	what	kind	of	system	they	are	actually	facing	 here:	 everyday	waiting,	 performance	 art	 in	 a	 public	 space,	 or	 political	 protest?	The	 Luhmannian	 condition	 of	 an	 autonomous	 observation	 and	 differentiation	 is	 not	available:	 the	 police	 have	 been	 temporarily	 relocated	 to	 an	 impossible	 place,	 which	excludes	 their	 usual	 trademark	 of	 decisive	 action.9	 This	 very	 moment	 of	 uncertainty	which	the	performance	of	Duran	Adam	releases	and	which,	in	this	situation,	undermines	the	state’s	power	to	act,	once	again	allows	an	action	fed	by	artistic	practice	to	become	a	political	one,	because	it	destabilizes	otherwise	established	boundaries	between	systems	–	 even	 that	 between	 dance	 and	 choreography.	 If	 choreography	 were	 a	 second	 level	medium	(in	Luhmann’s	terms)	that	(to	return	to	Martin)	is	only	actualized	through	the	coming	 together	 of	 performers	 and	 the	 audience,	 the	 question	 remains	 of	 whether	choreography	is	the	medium	of	protest	if	it	is	not	recognized	as	such.	And	of	dance	also	there	remains	merely	 the	Martinian	 formulation	of	 “embodied	practice”	 (Martin	1998,	5),	as	 the	momentum	of	a	“mobilization	of	participation	 in	relation	to	a	choreographic	idea”	(Martin	1998,	4)	becomes	ambiguous.		 Participation	–	in	this	case	the	observation	of	and	decision	regarding	an	act	which	breaks	ranks	with	the	everyday	–	is,	then,	an	important	condition	for	the	translation	of	a	(choreographic)	movement	into	a	political	one.	From	the	various	pieces	of	footage	which	exist	of	Ehud	Darash’s	performance	in	Tel	Aviv,	it	is	apparent	that	hardly	anyone	notices	the	actors	moving	against	 the	stream,	or	 that	 they,	as	 in	 the	Gündüz	example,	become	irritated	(or	later	even	join	in	the	act10);	and	therefore	that	this	does	not	even	qualify	as	a	particular/additional	act	of	protest.	However,	the	act	cannot	be	completely	dismissed	as	pretentious	or	apolitical.	The	element	of	space,	briefly	mentioned	above,	still	plays	a	crucial	role.	
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Reoccupying	Spaces	In	their	acts,	both	Erdem	Gündüz	and	Ehud	Darash	occupy	a	public	place	–	the	city	–	for	a	certain	period	in	a	new	or	different	manner	from	that	in	which	it	is	usually	used.	They	achieve	 this	 through	 the	 long	 time	spent	 standing,	and	 the	slow-motion	sinking	of	 the	body.	These	tactics	are	partly	reminiscent	of	grass	roots	movements,	such	as	sit-ins	or	the	 like,	 although	 these	 are	 mostly	 carried	 out	 by	 larger,	 more	 compact	 groups	 and	clearly	diverge	from	everyday	behavior	straight	away,	as	people	do	not	usually	sit	down	in	the	middle	of	a	busy	road.	Gündüz’s	behavior,	by	contrast,	is	not	immediately	unusual,	but	 instead	becomes	notable	 through	 the	 length	of	 his	wait	 and	 the	 gaze	 fixed	on	 the	Atatürk	Cultural	Center;	the	longer	his	position	lasts	–	and	this	seems	to	be	a	feature	of	the	act	–	the	more	he	resembles	a	living	version	(although	admittedly	a	rather	relaxed	version)	of	one	of	the	many	statues	of	heroic	figures	to	be	found	in	cities	like	Istanbul.	The	tactical	movements	of	the	group	around	Darash	however	are	much	more	strikingly	different,	although	hardly	anyone	really	seems	to	notice	this.		 Michel	 de	 Certeau	 differentiates	 between	 strategies	 and	 tactics.	 He	 defines	 the	former	as	power	options	and	institutions	which	normally	have	their	own	“place”	at	their	disposal	and	under	their	control	–	he	gives	“military	strategy”	as	a	significant	example	(De	Certeau	1988,	35-36).	Tactics,	however,	are	based	on	a	lack	of	possession:	
 The	space	of	tactic	is	the	space	of	the	other.	Thus	it	must	play	on	and	with	a	terrain	imposed	on	it	and	organized	by	the	law	of	a	foreign	power.	[…]	It	must	vigilantly	make	use	of	the	cracks	that	particular	conjunctions	open	in	the	surveillance	of	 the	proprietary	powers.	 It	poaches	 in	them.	It	creates	surprises	 in	 them.	 It	can	be	where	 it	 is	 least	expected	(De	Certeau	1998,	37).	
 It	 is	consequently	possible	 to	 take	possession	of	otherwise	hegemony-occupied	spaces	very	briefly	and	to	reorganize	them	–	flash	mobs	could	be	an	example	of	this.	Comparing	the	performances	by	Gündüz	and	Darash,	we	could	draw	the	 tentative	conclusion	 that	the	moment	of	surprise	emphasized	by	de	Certeau	is	greater	in	Duran	Adam:		in	spite	of	extensive	state	controls	and	bans	 it	succeeds	 in	using	the	act	to	 find	a	gap,	a	 loophole,	and	uses	this	to	re-occupy	the	state-controlled	space	temporarily	and	to	suspend,	for	a	time,	 the	 power	 to	 act	 of	 the	 organs	 of	 the	 state.	 Darash	 and	 his	 dancers,	 however,	apparently	do	not	cause	a	stir	 in	Tel	Aviv,	perhaps	less	strictly	policed	that	Istanbul	 in	
 16	
this	 protest	 situation,	 and	 this	 is	 on	 the	 edge	 of	 a	 form	 of	 demonstration	 in	 which	alternative,	creative	formats	are	frequently	used	to	express	discontent.		 In	this	regard,	is	Darash’s	act	to	be	perceived	as	less	political,	and	more	artistic?	Once	more,	the	mode	of	political	activity	must	be	considered.	Oliver	Marchart,	against	a	background	 of	 theoretical	 concepts	 of	 the	 political	 as	 developed	 by	 Hannah	 Arendt,	speaks	of	political	acting	as	dancing:	“Political	acting,	for	Arendt,	is	structurally	the	same	as	dancing.”	 In	 this,	he	 is	alluding	 to	 the	sensual	aspects	of	political	acting,	a	behavior	that	never	pursues	exclusively	utilitarian	aims	and	that	Arendt	identifies	in	the	student	protests	 of	 1968	 (Marchart	 2013,	 45,	 41	 ff.).	 This	 idea	 of	 the	 “dancing	 protest”,	 also	discussed	by	Ernesto	Laclau	and	Chantal	Mouffe,	 ends	 in	a	kind	of	playful	antagonism	that	 takes	 place	 in	 community:	 “To	 dance	 politically	 […]	 means	 dancing	 together”	(Marchart	2013,	45).		One	 of	 several	 examples	 Marchart	 uses	 is	 the	 Israeli	 group	 Public	 Movement,	which	 also	 involved	 an	 initially	 artistically	 constructed	 concept	 translating	 into	politically	 effective	 resistance	 on	 the	margins	 of	 the	 2011	 social	 protests	 in	 Jaffa,	 Tel	Aviv.	Using	a	kind	of	guerilla	tactic,	Public	Movement	blocked	crossings	in	Tel	Aviv	with	simple	 circular	 dances.	 Because	 the	 dances	 and	 songs	 were	 very	 well-known	 and	widespread	in	Israel,	the	single	group	members	soon	expanded	into	larger	gatherings,	in	which	many	passers-by,	 in	 dancing,	momentarily	 blocked	 an	 area	 of	 public	 space	 and	therefore	 protested	 together	 (Marchart	 2013,	 55-56).	 It	 may	 be	 worth	 noting	 a	particular	element	of	Darash’s	performance:	that	the	act	was	not	originally	conceived	to	prompt	others	to	join	in.11	Darash’s	concept	thus	seems,	considering	the	aforementioned	moment	 of	 counter-movement	 on	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 demonstration,	 not	 ‘oppositional	enough’	to	provoke	(political)	awareness	and	or	the	accompanying	literal	act	of	turning	round.	 However,	 considering	 the	 principle	 behind	 Darash’s	 performance,	 we	 could	describe	it	as	a	tactic	which	temporarily	changes	the	space,	and	which	offers	sinking	and	surrendering	as	an	alternative	to	the	 idea	of	antagonism,	which	seems	to	play	such	an	important	role	in	political	acting.		According	 to	 de	 Certeau,	 the	 mode	 of	 time	 and	 in	 this	 instance	 particularly	tempo	play	a	role	in	moments	of	tactical	appropriations:	
 Tactics	are	procedures	that	gain	validity	in	relation	to	the	pertinence	they	lend	 to	 time	 –	 to	 the	 circumstances	 which	 the	 precise	 instant	 of	 an	intervention	 transforms	 into	 a	 favorable	 situation,	 to	 the	 rapidity	 of	 the	
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movements	 that	 change	 the	 organization	 of	 a	 space,	 to	 the	 relations	among	 successive	moments	 in	 an	 action,	 to	 the	possible	 intersections	of	duration	and	heterogeneous	rhythms,	etc	(De	Certeau	1988,	38).	
 Both	Darash	and	Gündüz,	by	contrast,	rely	on	deceleration,	rather	than	on	suddenness	or	 acceleration	 of	 political	 interventions.	 They	 do,	 however,	 make	 use	 both	 of	 the	momentum	of	rhythmic	counter-movement	and	the	overlapping	of	different	movement	spaces,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 moment	 de	 Certeau	 describes	 as	 favorable:	 the	 moment	 of	indecision	 between	 everyday	 behavior,	 art,	 and	 protest.	 It	 is	 such	 a	moment	 Gündüz	‘stands	through’,	and	the	political	and	creative	uproar	in	Tel	Aviv	through	which	Darash,	in	this	situation,	offers	and	experiments	with	different,	artistic	forms	of	protest.	Through	this,	both	create	public	awareness:	Gündüz	in	the	political	register,	supported	not	least	through	 social	 media,12	 and	 Darash	 rather	 in	 the	 context	 of	 artistic	 formats	 like	 the	Berlin	 Tanz	 im	 August	 (Dance	 in	 August)	 festival,	 where,	 in	 2011,	 he	 described	 his	performance	in	a	public	presentation.13	
 In	 the	 preceding	 discussion	 and	 examples	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 show	 the	 extent	 to	 which	choreographic	and	dance	movements	become	(unstable)	media	for	the	alternative	use	of	public	 space,	 a	 process	 particularly	 characterized	 by	 playful	 tactics	 and	 by	 rendering	unclear	the	boundaries	between	everyday,	artistic,	and	political	behavior.	Described	by	Martin	 as	mobilizations,	 they	 communicate	 social	 protest	 in	 a	 playful	way,	 or	 at	 least	reflect,	 as	 with	 Darash’s	 public	 act,	 habitualized	 forms	 of	 resistance,	 otherwise	expressed	through	standing	tall	and	striding	forwards.		 In	 this,	 choreographic	movements	 become	 first	 of	 all	 an	 embodied	medium	 of	political	 protest,	 or	 related	 reflective	 behaviors:	 acts	 visible	 to	 the	 public	 which	 are	organized	in	a	physical,	spatial,	time-conscious	way	may	be	understood	as	a	protest	that,	in	 particular,	 momentarily	 uses	 locations	 of	 power	 for	 alternative	 purposes	 and	reformulates	them.	The	political	potential	of	each	act	therefore	becomes	evident	when	the	boundaries	 of	 dance	 and	 choreography	 as	 (embodied	 and	 structure-giving)	media	become	uncertain:	Luhmann	and	Martin	show	that	systematically	 indistinct	situations,	or	those	which	cannot	be	differentiated	in	everyday,	artistic	or	political	terms	have	the	potential	for	irritation	and	for	possible	reformulations	of	established	social	behavior.	As	a	 result,	 in	 their	 moments	 of	 uncertainty,	 dance	 and	 choreography	 become	communicative	 media	 articulating	 protest.	 As	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Duran	 Adam,	 politically	
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significant	 places	 can,	 for	 a	 certain	 length	 of	 time,	 be	 literally	 rewritten	 and	 re-choreographed	at	the	same	time.	Artistic	practices	can,	then,	become	agents	in	the	true	sense	 of	 the	 word:	 performative,	 biopolitical	 mediators	 of	 protest	 that	 can,	 at	 least	temporarily,	subvert	established	boundaries	of	political	behavior	and	systems.		 	
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                                                NOTES	
1Cf.	http://www.erdemgunduz.org/,	accessed	13.4.2016.	2	See	e.g.	Steve	Paxton’s	concept	of	the	Small	Dance	(Paxton/Zimmer	1977,	11).	3	At	the	end	of	his	explanations	Lepecki	contours	the	“still	act	as	movement	of	resistance.”	(Lepecki	2001,	47).	4	Cf.	Sabine	Weier:	“Blogger	als	Performer.	Unsere	Erfahrungen	bei	Ehud	Darashs	‘Constructing	Resilience’,	entry	from	15.8.2012	at:	http://tanzimaugust-blog.de/blogger-als-performer/	(accessed	13.4.2016).	5	He	takes	the	crawling	actions	of	artist	William	Pope	L.	as	example,	that	Lepecki	calls	“[s]tumbling	dance”.	In	this,	Pope	L.	moves	strictly	horizontally	through	the	street	canyons	of	New	York,	thus	making	a	“choreopolitical	statement”:	“Pope	L.’s	crawls	propose	a	kinetic	critique	of	verticality,	of	verticality’s	association	with	phallic	erectility	and	its	intimate	association	with	the	‘brutality	of	political	power,	of	the	means	of	constraint:	policy,	army,	bureaucracy’”	(Lepecki	2006,	93;	he	is	quoting	Henri	Lefebvre’s	The	
Production	of	Space,	1991).	6	Here,	Martin	opts	for	integrating	these	fundamental	constellations	into	the	analysis	of	dance,	which	must	therefore	take	into	account	not	only	the	examination	of	dance	as	the	on-stage	representation	of	movement,	but	also	the	specific	set	up	of	it.	From	this	perspective,	dance	can	moreover	serve	as	a	model	for	locating	the	political	and	recognizing	social	connections.	Ibid.,	S.	38,	46.	Due	to	considerations	of	space,	I	cannot	go	into	Martin’s	connected	problematized	relationship	between	“agency”	and	“history”	here.		
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                                                                                                                                                   7	Fischer-Lichte	formulates	this	with	theatre	studies	expert	Max	Herrmann.	Erika	Fischer-Lichte:	The	
Transformative	Power	of	Performance.	A	new	aesthetics	(2004),	New	York:	Routledge,	2008,	p.	38.	8	In	this,	these	boundaries	have	“the	double	function	of	separating	and	connecting	system	and	environment.	This	double	function	can	be	clarified	by	means	of	the	distinction	between	element	and	relation,	a	clarification	that	at	the	same	time	returns	us	to	the	thematic	of	complexity.	As	soon	as	boundaries	are	defined	sharply,	elements	must	attribute	either	to	the	system	or	the	environment.	Yet	relations	between	system	and	environment	can	exist.	Thus	a	boundary	separates	elements,	but	not	necessarily	relations.	It	separates	events,	but	lets	causal	effects	pass	through.”	Luhmann:	Social	Systems,	1995,	p.	28-29.	9	On	an	alternative	medial	level,	mobilization	and	participation	in	the	sense	of	an	activated	audience	are	otherwise	achieved	in	an	almost	‘classical’	way:	after	it	has	spread	and	been	mobilized	via	social	media,	ever	more	people	join	Gündüz’s	standing	protest	and	join	in	with	it.	Andy	Carvin:	“The	‘Standing	Man’	Of	Turkey:	Act	Of	Quiet	Protest	Goes	Viral”,	on:		NPR	News,	18.6.2013,	http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/06/18/193183899/the-standing-man-of-turkey-act-of-quiet-protest-goes-viral	(accessed	13.4.2016)	10	Cf.	footnote	9.	11	Neither	does	this	apply	to	performance	artist	William	Pope	L.,	who	Lepecki	uses	as	an	example	–	this	is	about	a	critique	of	the	(urban	western)	ideology	of	the	vertical	as	an	arrangement	of	hierarchical	systems.	Cf.	footnote	5.		12	Cf.	footnote	9.	13	I	saw	the	showing	on	24.8.2011	as	part	of	Tanz	im	August	in	the	studio	of	Berlin’s	Podewil.	
